CV and Bio
Welcome to my website! I am an Assistant Professor of Finance at McGill University (Desautels Faculty of Management).
Research interests: Corporate Finance, Entrepreneurship, Labor and Finance, FinTech.
My CV is available here: CV.
Email: paul.beaumont@mcgill.ca
Publications
with Camille Hebert (University of Toronto) and Victor Lyonnet (Michigan Ross)
Review of Financial Studies (2025)
Abstract: Firms either enter new sectors by building on their resources or buying existing companies. Using French administrative data, we propose a measure of human capital distance between a firm and a sector of entry. Using a shift-share instrument, we show that firms build in close sectors and buy in distant sectors in terms of human capital distance. Firms build by hiring new workers, which becomes increasingly costly in distant sectors as it requires not only hiring more workers but also having more organizational capital to integrate these workers. Hence, firms buy in distant sectors to acquire already operational human capital.
Press coverage: Rotman Insights Hub
with Huan Tang (Wharton) and Eric Vansteenberghe (PSE)
Review of Financial Studies (2025)
Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of introducing junior unsecured loans (i.e., FinTech loans) in the small business lending market. Using French administrative data, we find that firms experience a 13% increase in bank credit after receiving a FinTech loan. We use propensity score matching procedures and a shift-share instrument to account for credit demand. The credit increase only occurs when FinTech borrowers invest in new assets, and Fintech borrowers are subsequently more likely to pledge collateral to banks. This suggests that firms use FinTech loans to acquire assets that they then pledge to banks, thereby increasing total borrowing capacity.
Press coverage: Delve (podcast), Knowledge at Wharton
Working Papers
with Clémence Lenoir (DG Trésor) - (September 2025)
R&R at Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Abstract: How do recessions impact firms' customer relationships? Using a French trade credit reform for identification, we find that, following the 2008-9 global trade collapse, financially constrained firms export less years after the recession because they are less likely to regain customers lost during the collapse. Regaining lost customers entails costs similar to attracting new ones, implying that recessions cause firms' customer capital to depreciate by interrupting relationships. Consistent with the idea that firms that need to reinvest less in customer capital should recover more easily from recessions, we find weaker sales effects of financing constraints for firms with stronger relationships.
Selected presentations: GEP/CEPR, EFA, FIRS, NFA (Best Ph.D. Paper), SFS Cavalcade.
Press coverage: VoxFi
with David Schumacher (McGill) and Gregory Weitzner (McGill) - (July 2025)
Abstract: We use callable bonds as a laboratory to test whether relationship lending can be sustained in public financial markets. Fixed-price calls allow firms to repurchase bonds at a low price, resulting in a transfer from debtholders to equityholders. We show that following a fixed-price call, existing bondholders are less likely to participate in the firm's future bond issuances. This behavior, which resembles punishment in reputation models, is more pronounced for funds managed by large families. We also show that large-family funds behave like relationship lenders and that firms are less likely to call their bonds when there are more of them in their bondholder base. Finally, firms that develop a reputation for calling aggressively incur higher subsequent borrowing costs. Our results provide evidence of relationship lending in bond markets sustained through firm reputation.
Press coverage: FinReg blog
Selected presentations: U Dauphine, Banque de France, U Laval, U York, Rome Junior Finance Conference, Aarhus Workshop, NFA, FIFI, MFA.
with Johan Hombert (HEC Paris) and Adrien Matray (Harvard) - (April 2026)
Abstract: Can reducing contracting costs between entrepreneurs and investors enhance entrepreneurial success? We assemble a novel dataset of company bylaws covering the near-universe of firms incorporated in France between 2004 and 2012. We show that many new firms, including non-VC-backed firms, tailor their bylaws by modifying default provisions on ownership and control rights, while cash-flow rights are less frequently customized. Such tailoring correlates with proxies for asymmetric information and entrepreneur sophistication. Exploiting a 2008 French reform that lowered the cost of bylaws customization, we show that increased contractual flexibility led to higher equity financing at creation and to persistent increases in investment, employment, and revenue growth.
Selected presentations: ASU Sonoran, WEFI, UIC Conference, WFA, EFA, NFA, FOM, WashU Conference, Paris Finance December Meetings, Milan JCF Conference, The Law and Finance of PE and VC Conference.
Replication package
with Mathias Lé (Banque de France) - (April 2026)
Abstract: Do firms value access to multiple financial products from the same bank ("universal banking")? We exploit the 2016 acquisition of two single-product lenders by a French universal bank to test whether firms take up multiple products from the same bank to save on search costs. We find that after the acquisition, only firms using high-information products from the acquired lenders take up additional products from the acquirer. This pattern cannot be explained by differences in credit demand, post-merger integration, or cross-selling opportunities. Our results suggest that multi-product borrowing reflects banks exploiting information accumulated within lending relationships rather than demand for universal banking.
Draft available upon request.
Selected presentations: HEC-McGill Winter Seminar, ESCP- Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne Workshop, PSB Workshop on Banks and Financial Markets, Liverpool MDMP.
with Adrien Matray (Atlanta Fed), Yachi Tu (Berkeley), and Chenzi Xu (Berkeley) - (April 2026)
Abstract: Empirical researchers often estimate treatment effects at different levels of aggregation to address confounding shocks or to detect violations of the stable unit treatment value assumption. We show that, under standard specifications, treatment effect estimates generally differ across levels of aggregation even in the absence of market shocks or SUTVA violations. These gaps arise mechanically from weighting schemes, entry and exit, and Jensen's inequality, and we characterize the conditions under which they become quantitatively important. We propose several simple specifications that reconcile estimates across levels of aggregation.
Draft available upon request.
Permanent Working Papers
with Thibault Libert (ACPR/PSE) and Christophe Hurlin (Université d'Orléans).
Abstract: This paper uses a credit registry covering the quasi universe of firm-bank relationships in France for the period 1999-2016 to provide a detailed account of the role of very large borrowers ("granular borrowers") in shaping bank-level and aggregate credit variations. We document that the distribution of borrowers is fat-tailed, the top 100 borrowers representing 18% of aggregate long-term credit and 64% of total undrawn credit lines. We adapt the methodology of Amiti and Weinstein (2018) to identify the contributions of firm, bank, and aggregate shocks to credit variations at any level of aggregation. At the macroeconomic level, we show that aggregate properties of credit largely reflect granular borrowers’ shocks. This finding highlights the limitations of using time series of aggregate credit to assess the magnitude of financial frictions in the economy. At the bank-level, we find that the concentration of the borrower bases of banks exposes them to considerable borrower idiosyncratic risk and leads liquidity flows to be more synchronized across banks.
Other Writings
with Antoine Luciani
Document de travail DESE, 2018
with Antoine Luciani and Ihssane Slimani Houti
Insee Analyses, 2016
Press coverage: Le Monde, Les Echos
Insee Références, 2016
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